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Showing posts with label Honda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Honda. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 3, 2014

Is Takata's airbag propellant the root cause of problem?

NHTSA demands info about Takata's airbag propellant


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Special Report: Plant with troubled
past at center of Takata air bag probe
By Joanna Zuckerman Bernstein and Ben Klayman
CIUDAD FRONTERA Mexico/DETROIT Thu Nov 20, 2014 8:06am EST

Sunday, November 2, 2014

Safety Agency is Failing the Public on Air Bags

Safety agency is failing the public on air bags


A crash test of a 2003 Toyota Corolla, one of the models subject to a recall to repair faulty air bags. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is warning 7.8 million car owners that inflator mechanisms in the air bags can rupture, causing metal fragments to fly out when the bags are deployed
A crash test of a 2003 Toyota Corolla, one of the models subject to a recall to repair faulty air bags. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is warning 7.8 million car owners that inflator mechanisms in the air bags can rupture, causing metal fragments to fly out when the bags are deployed Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
Jeff Gelles, Inquirer Business Columnist
Is an auto-safety system reliant on manufacturers' recalls no more trustworthy, say, than an aging Takata air bag in a hot, humid climate?

That's how it looks to advocates like Clarence Ditlow, director of the Center for Auto Safety. Ironically, thanks to the failures of the system he criticizes, you may not realize just how perilous Takata air bags can be - even if you have one in your car.

As many as 30 million U.S. vehicles may be equipped with air bags whose deteriorating inflators could blow apart and send shards flying like shrapnel. But since Tokyo-based Takata says the risk is linked to hot, humid climates, fewer than 1 in 3 have been recalled.

To Ditlow, this is a flashing red light signaling an old problem: a safety system still broken 14 years after Congress supposedly fixed it with 2000's TREAD Act - passed after a furor over injuries and deaths blamed on Firestone tires with separating tread, many on Ford Explorer SUVs.

As with those tires and the rollover crashes they triggered, it took years for regulators to wake up to more recent hazards, such as faulty ignition switches that can turn GM cars into death traps if a key ring weighs too much.

Each delay likely leads to more injury and death. Yet the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, charged with shepherding defect probes, at best seems underfinanced and overmatched by the auto industry. Ditlow sees a deeper issue, too. With a revolving door linking NHTSA to the industry, he says, it's become a classic "captive regulator," loyal more to the firms it oversees than to the customers it is supposed to protect.

"Obviously, Congress didn't get it right," Ditlow told me while outlining the failures of TREAD - the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act.

For instance, the law requires automakers to report each death and injury that might be tied to a defective part. But instead of requiring documentation that could speed investigations, NHTSA accepts vague summaries.

"They have a category of 'air bag,' and now 60 percent of death and injury reports say 'air bag,' " Ditlow says. That can include air bags that fired when they shouldn't or didn't seem to deploy properly. The case of the Takata air bags is completely different: The hazard apparently arises when an inflator's casing rots so much that it flies apart when an air bag, as designed, fires with explosive force.

So far, Takata has confirmed two deaths, and two more are suspected. Three of those four are outside the recall zone. In one, Ditlow says, "investigators thought it was a homicide. They'd never seen such sharp-edged wounds."

One question, which arises in every big defect case, is how many deaths or serious injuries are buried by the civil-justice system. Victims and their families are pushed to sign nondisclosure orders in return for settlements. The money may cover the costs of treatment or ease the pain of a severe injury or family's loss. But the gag order likely means more future victims, because fewer people will hear of the hazard.

How do you know if you're at risk from the Takata defect? It's not easy - one reason about 30 percent of all recall repairs never get done. Last month, NHTSA published a list of 7.8 million vehicles affected - mostly older Hondas, but also from nine other automakers. You can find it at SaferCar.gov or call 888-327-4236.

If you search NHTSA's site by your vehicle's VIN number, the regionally limited recalls mean you may not learn you have a suspect air bag. And if you call a Philadelphia-area dealer, you'll get a response that varies by manufacturer, says one local service manager. Nissan has plenty of parts. Toyota won't have them until New Year's. Honda has some, but it's prioritizing places with persistent heat and humidity.

And if your Accord, say, spent most of its first 10 years at Mom and Dad's Florida retirement condo? Make noise, and ask for an exception. Or follow Toyota's advice: Avoid the front passenger seat until the repair is done.

Could the defect be tied to age rather than just climate, as Ditlow speculates? Could NHTSA do more, and quicker - such as use its power to speed replacement parts from third-party suppliers?
Yes, and yes. But nothing is likely to happen unless the agency gets a stronger directive, and more support, from Congress.

The Obama administration has ordered a review of the "safety culture" at NHTSA. That's a start. But the problem isn't just culture. The problem is a system that allows evidence of a defect to be buried along with its victims.


jgelles@phillynews.com 215-854-2776 @jeffgelles

www.inquirer.com/consumer

 
Jeff GellesInquirer Business Columnist




 


Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Weak Oversight, Deadly Cars

The Opinion Pages          Op-Ed Contributors

Weak Oversight, Deadly Cars

By Clarence Ditlow and Ralph Nader  October 28, 2014


http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/opinion/weak-oversight-deadly-cars.html?_r=0

WHEN regulators sleep and auto companies place profits over safety, safety defects pile up. A record number of vehicles — more than 50 million — have been recalled this year, a result of congressional hearings and Justice Department prosecutions, which exposed a mass of deadly defects that the auto industry had concealed.
From the Ford Explorer rollovers in the 1990s and Toyotas’ issue with unintended acceleration in the 2000s to the recent fatal consequences of defective General Motors ignition switches and Takata airbags, the auto companies hid defects to avoid recalls and save money. These and other major defects were first exposed by safety advocates who petitioned the government and by reporters in the tradition of Bob Irvin of The Detroit News, who wrote over 35 articles on Chevrolet engine mounts until General Motors agreed to recall 6.7 million vehicles in 1971.
These campaigners did the job the regulator should have done. Congress gave the Department of Transportation authority to regulate the auto industry through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration — including subpoena authority to find defects. But it used this authority so infrequently after the ’70s that its acting administrator, David J. Friedman, told Congress this year that he didn’t even know it had the power. The N.H.T.S.A. also failed to require companies to disclose death-claim records in civil lawsuits over the Toyota accelerations, G.M. ignition switches and Takata airbags.
In order to prevent the risk of death or serious injury, Congress empowered the agency to oblige auto companies to use alternate suppliers and independent repair shops to manufacture parts and make repairs to expedite a recall fix. Yet the N.H.T.S.A. has never used this authority — even though it took General Motors from February to October to get enough parts to dealers to repair all the recalled ignition switches.
Only after a lengthy delay was the agency prodded, in 2009, into opening an investigation into whether the first two Honda recalls of Takata airbags were adequate. Although the agency asked tough questions, it quickly closed the investigation after Takata hired a former senior N.H.T.S.A. official to represent the company. The agency’s attitude, in short, was: Don’t bother us with the facts.
More facts did come out when BMW, Honda, Nissan and Toyota recalled millions of Takata airbags from 2010 to 2013. Still, the N.H.T.S.A. opened no investigations and ordered no recalls on the airbags. Honda also failed to disclose death and injury claims on Takata airbags, as required by law. Even now — after reports of a third death in the United States associated with the airbags — the N.H.T.S.A. refuses to order a national recall, as Senators Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Edward Markey of Massachusetts have urged.
What explains this neglect? Over time, the N.H.T.S.A. has been captured by the industry it regulates. Through the ’70s, it aggressively litigated cases to force recalls, and it caught most defects early in the life of a vehicle. Beginning in the ’80s, however, numerous officials — including Diane K. Steed, Jerry Ralph Curry, Sue Bailey and David L. Strickland, who all served as head of the agency, and Erika Z. Jones, Jacqueline S. Glassman and Paul Jackson Rice, who all served as chief counsel to the agency — have gone on to become consultants, lawyers or expert witnesses for auto companies.
What’s more, the agency is heavily populated by former industry employees. Ms. Glassman, for example, had been a lawyer for Chrysler before working at the agency (and is now at a law firm that represents auto companies). The agency’s last non-acting administrator, Mr. Strickland, went to work in January of 2014 for a firm representing Chrysler — the same month the agency approved an inadequate recall of Chrysler Jeeps with fuel tanks liable to explode as a result of rear impacts.

Although Congress has given the N.H.T.S.A. regulatory tools that the agency failed to use, Congress has not given it the two things it needs most: sufficient funding, and the power to bring criminal penalties against auto companies. The agency’s annual vehicle safety budget is a puny $134 million. Unlike other federal regulators, the N.H.T.S.A. does not have its own research and test facility.
Since the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was enacted in 1966, the industry has blocked any meaningful provision for criminal penalties that would make company executives who concealed defects or decided not to recall dangerous vehicles subject to prison sentences. No single reform would change corporate behavior as much as this.
Only a complete overhaul of the agency’s culture will prevent future recalls, since automakers will always place sales and profits over safety and innovation. This should start with closing the revolving door, adopting criminal penalties and increasing funding. All auto companies should have an independent, government-certified safety ombudsman to investigate complaints from whistle-blowers and to report defects directly to the chief executive and the agency.
Above all, the agency’s leaders must have proven transportation safety expertise. They must demonstrate that they see auto companies as an industry to be regulated, rather than partners whose profits and sales must be protected at the public’s expense.


Weak Oversight, Deadly Cars